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For the past two  years, France has enjoyed fertility rates approaching replacement 
level, with a total fertility rate of 1.98 in 2006 and 2.00 in 2008. After a ten-year period of 
slow growth, the fertility rate has thus reached its highest level in about thirty years (Prioux, 
2007), placing France in top position among European and other OECD countries. However, 
this high level of fertility is somewhat puzzling, because most of the trends impacting the 
transition to adulthood that have emerged in Western countries since the 1970s may also be 
seen in France. Young people have increased their educational investment, delayed their entry 
onto  the  labour  market,  their  departure  from  their  parents‘  homes  or  their  entry  into 
parenthood. The changes have been especially significant for women, whose labour force 
participation continues to increase. The young generations face relatively high unemployment 
rates and have become increasingly uncertain about their labour force status.  
Demographic changes are also shaped by the transformation of values, such as those 
related to the increasing concern about gender equality, or the affirmation of what Giddens 
and subsequent authors have named the ―individualism of society‖. Such changes may help to 
explain the increase in non-marital cohabitation, the use of contraceptives and birth control, or 
the rise in divorce. However, one should be cautious about these changes in values since there 
is also some resistance to gender equality, as reflected by the very limited changes in the 
division of domestic and care activities between men and women.   
All  these  factors  help  explain  why  the  younger  generations  are  inclined  to  delay 
childbearing in France, like in other Western countries, leading potentially to a permanent low 
fertility situation (Kohler, Billari, Ortega, 2006; Morgan and Taylor, 2006; Lutz et al., 2006). 
However, although France exhibits most of the above-mentioned trends, fertility remains at a 
relatively high level compared with other continental or southern European countries. This 
situation  reflects  some  specific  characteristics  of  fertility  behaviour:  a  relatively  low 
proportion of women remaining childless; an increasing trend towards a two-child norm and a 
standardization of childbirth timing. There are also fairly small differences in family size 
across social classes. All these factors produces relatively stable fertility rates after controlling 
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for tempo changes (Toulemon et al., 2008). All these characteristics are detailed in the first 
part of this chapter. 
One factor that explains this situation is the longstanding family policy implemented 
in France, especially since World War II. With its diversity of values and principles, France 
has  a  variable  and  often  contradictory  position  in  the  classification  of  Western  welfare 
systems (Meulders and O‘Dorchai, 2007; Th￩venon, 2006). The second part of this paper 
briefly  presents  the  background  to  the  family  policies,  their  relation  to  families‘  living 
standards and how they have been progressively influenced by the issue of the work-family 
balance. Support to families, and especially to working parents, is relatively comprehensive, 
i.e. quite diversified and continuous over the entire child-rearing period. A key difference 
with respect to certain other Continental European countries is that women find relatively 
broad  support  for  combining  entry  into  employment  and  motherhood,  i.e.  full-time 
employment and the birth of the first child (Thévenon, 2006). 
However, it is difficult to assess the effective impact of these family-friendly policies 
on fertility behaviour. One obvious reason is that the family policy package forms a whole 
which does not simply add up to the sum of its parts, as stated by Héran (2002). There is no 
doubt that the entire set of family policy instruments contributes to a favourable environment 
for  fertility  and  the  well-being  of  families;  yet  at  the  same  time,  the  interconnection  of 
instruments makes it difficult to assess the impact of each one individually. In spite of this 
limitation, the third section of this paper reviews the studies carried out on the impact of these 
policies  on  fertility  and  related  labour  market  behaviour.  We  first  review  cross-country 
comparisons which conclude that the effect of direct financial support on fertility is relatively 
weak but which highlight the impact of policies targeting the labour market. The analyses for 
France also point to a rather limited impact on fertility of cash and benefit transfers, but stress 
the influence of labour market policies on the female workforce and the work-life balance. 
We  argue  that  this  comprehensive  and  longstanding  policy  creates  a  secure  climate  for 
simultaneously entering employment and motherhood. The comprehensive support delivered 
to working parents, the continuous help received by parents with young children, and the 
variety  of  benefits  granted  to  address  the  diverse  needs  of  families  are  certainly  crucial 
ingredients of the ―trust‖ needed for policies to be effective. This may explain why a fairly 
low proportion of women remain childless and why having a child has only a weak negative 
impact on the probability of women working full-time. Extensive childcare support (through 
paid parental leave, childcare benefits, childcare services, early enrolment in preschool, and 
the provision of out-of-school care) is another reason why women do not forgo a second or 
third child and also explains why the decision to have children or to work is less dependent on 
socioeconomic status in France than in other countries. 
I.  Fertility trends and family size 
I.1.  A long-term decrease in fertility... 
The  recent  high  fertility  rate  is  viewed  as  a  sign  of  the  optimism  of  the  French 
population, since for the second consecutive year it has stood at its highest level since 1982 
(Prioux, 2007). France was the first European country to post a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.0 
in 2006 (1.98 excluding the French overseas departments and territories), an increase of 2.9% 
with  respect  to  2005.  Although  fertility  rates  still  remain  slightly  lower  than  in  English 
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However, this fertility rebound also concerns other countries with different policies, 
such as the UK or the Nordic countries where the TFR is now higher than 1.8 children per 
woman.  Nevertheless,  France  holds  a  singular  position  in  continental  Europe,  where  two 
groups of countries stand out (Prioux, 2007): on the one hand, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, which show a relatively stable TFR around the intermediate level of 1.7; on the 
other hand, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, with fertility rates of 1.3 to 1.4 respectively 
and whose situation is therefore closer to that of low-fertility countries. In fact, the fertility 
rates have recently started to increase on average in all European countries, whereas this is not 
detectable for all OECD countries. 
Focusing  exclusively on  total  fertility rates  can be misleading since they  are very 
sensitive to the timing of childbirth. In particular, a postponement of births causes a decrease 
in the period rate which is based on the assumption of stable birth timing. Thus, the usual 
TFR  leads  to  an  underestimation  of  the  period  fertility  level.  For  that  reason,  more 
sophisticated indexes that control for differences in fertility by birth parity and changes in 
interval  between  births  are  preferred  (Rallu  and  Toulemon,  1994;  Sobotka  et  al.,  2005; 
Bongaarts and Feeney, 2006). The Parity and Duration Total Fertility Rate (PDTFR, also 
named Period Average Parity) is a more consistent estimate of period fertility (Toulemon and 
Mazuy, 2001). Figure 1 shows a value of around 2.0 children per woman in France, which is 
very close to the cohort completed fertility rate estimated for the corresponding cohorts. 
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Source: Toulemon, Pailhé, Rossier (2008) 
This graph also illustrates the long-term trends in fertility rates over the 20th century. 
At first glance it tends to alter our assessment of the  long-term decline in fertility, since the 
current level of cohort fertility appears quite similar to that of the cohorts born around 1890 
and 1900. However, strong variations can be observed for cohorts born in  between: for the 
cohorts born up to the end of the 1960s fertility rates increased rapidly, but a decrease of 
similar intensity is observed after that. One major  change between the two points in time is 
the dramatic decrease in infant mortality over the century. Some 9% of children died in their 
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I.2.  … or delayed parenthood? 
Another important  change over the last  decades  concerns the timing of childbirth. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the average age at maternity by birth parity for women born 
from 1920 to 1965. The U-shape of the curves shows that women born between 1940 and 
1945 had their children at an earlier point in their life-cycle, e.g. at the age of 26 years on 
average, compared to 28.5 years for women born in 1920. A progressive postponement of 
births is observed, however, for women born after the Second World War.  Figure 2 also 
reveals that the decrease in average age at first maternity is quite limited compared with the 
trend for the last child. The reduction of the mother‘s age at the birth of the last child is 
explained by two factors of roughly equal importance: successive births are occurring over a 
shorter period, but large families are becoming progressively less frequent (Daguet 2002).  

















Source: Toulemon, 2003. 
Trends changed for women born after 1945 who had their children at later ages. The 
postponement of the first birth is sufficient in itself to explain the rise in the average age of 
women at childbirth. For women born in 1970 (not illustrated in the figure), the average age at 
first birth was around 27 years, and the average age at maternity is expected to be about 30 
years  (Toulemon,  2003).  Prioux  (2007)  reported  that  the  average  age  at  childbirth  has 
continued to increase for women born after 1970. This is estimated at 29.9 years for women 
born in 1973, i.e. one year later than for the cohort born in 1966. Prioux also argues that the 
increase in age at childbirth has already started to slow down slightly, and may probably level 
off for subsequent cohorts. However, this trend should not be misinterpreted since it is the 
result of a balance between a decrease in fertility rates at ages below 35 and an increase in 
fertility  rates  at  older  ages.  Thus,  the  dominant  trend  since  the  early  2000s  has  been  an 
accelerated  increase  in  fertility  rates  after  age  30,  as  if  most  of  the  women  born  in  the 
seventies who postponed childbearing have now ―caught-up‖ their delay.  
I.3.  A reduction of family size to two children 
 
Changes in family size have also been considerable over the last decades. Basically, 
for cohorts born in the early 1960s (i.e. the cohorts for which the completed fertility rate can 





































9  235 
make up  for  the delay  in  family  formation.  For cohorts born after 1964, the decrease in 
completed fertility has continued but at a slower pace.  
In a medium-term perspective, the decrease in average fertility for post-1930 cohorts 
reflects a decrease in the proportion of large families (i.e. with three or more children) and a 
tendency to limit family size to two children (Figure 3). The proportion of women with four 
children or more has fallen 2.5-fold (from 25% to 10%), while the proportion of women with 
two children has increased by half from 27% to 40%. By contrast, the percentage of women 
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Source: Toulemon, Pailhé, Rossier (2008) 
I.4.  A low proportion of childless women  
 
The parity progression ratios based on duration-specific fertility rates shown in Figure 
4 provide more precise information on recent trends. Basically, they confirm a decrease in the 
propensity to have a third or a fourth child. The progression to the first child (a0) also appears 
to be declining slightly, but this may be due to the postponement of family formation. By 
contrast, subsequent parity progression ratios are quite stable, indicating that the probability 
of a progression to the second (a1), third (a2) and fourth (a3) child has not significantly 
changed since 1975. Thus, the probability of remaining childless is certainly increasing, but 
the proportion of childless women still remains quite low in comparison with other European 
countries. Thus, in 2002 the actual percentage of childless women in relation to those with 
completed families was about 7% in France, versus around 12% in Germany or Austria (see 
Breton and Prioux). Toulemon (2003) estimates from a larger survey on families that only 
about 10% of French women born in 1950 remained childless; the proportion has been stable 
since 1935 and is expected to increase somewhat in the future.  
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I.5.  Limited differences in fertility across education levels and 
social groups 
 
Differences in family size between social groups are relatively small and decreasing 
slightly.  There  are,  however,  some  differences  in  fertility  behaviour  by  educational 
background. Robert-Bobée and Mazuy (2005) analysed these differences, taking account of 
changes in school leaving age across cohorts. For each of these cohorts, they distinguished 
individuals with a short period of education, i.e. with 2 years below the mean school leaving 
age of their birth cohort, from those with a long period of education (i.e. with 2 years more 
than the mean  age).  They thus  defined high- and low-education  groups, each  comprising 
around 30% of the cohort on each side of the central intermediate group. 
For  both  men  and  women,  the  average  number  of  children  has  declined  at  all 
educational levels, and the differences between groups are decreasing (Figure 5). For men, 
these differences are relatively moderate and even decreasing over cohorts. Nevertheless, men 
with a short period in education remain childless slightly more often, and they are also more 
likely to have three or more children. The contrasts are greater for women than for men. 
Among  the  cohorts  born  in  1950-54  and  observed  at  the  age  of  completed  fertility,  the 
average number of children ranged from 1.8 among women with more education to 2.4 for 
women with less. Women with a higher education more frequently remain childless (15% of 
women with a longer education born between 1945 and 1949 compared to 9% for those with 
medium education). There are basically two explanations for this: they less frequently live 
with a partner, but those living with a partner also have fewer children and remain childless 
for longer. 


















































Source: Toulemon, Pailhé, Rossier (2008) 
Differences in educational background also have a significant impact on the interval 
between births. People with a longer experience in education have a longer period without 
children, but the interval between the first and second child is also reduced. By contrast, 
individuals  with  low  education  have  their  first  child  sooner,  but  the  second  birth  occurs 
significantly  later  (Robert-Bobée  and  Mazuy,  2005).  The  two-child  family  is  also  more 
widespread among the highly educated whereas the proportion of three-child families has 
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least four children, has fallen for less educated women, but in a smaller proportion than for 
women with a higher educational level. 
All  in  all, differences  by  socioeconomic status  are relatively small compared  with 
other European countries. For instance, France is less dichotomous than Britain, where more 
women, especially among the most educated groups, decide to remain childless, (Ekert-Jaffé 
et al., 2002). France is also characterized by a growing and relatively high proportion of births 
outside  marriage,  which  illustrates  the  de-standardization  of  pathways  to  childbearing:  in 
2006, they represented 50.5% of all births in France (Pla, 2007), versus an average of only 
one third of all births  in EU 25.  
I.6.  Lower-than-intended fertility? 
One basic argument used to advocate family policies is that men and women do not 
have the number of children they would like. This hypothesis is not easy to validate, however.  
The first challenge is to quantify accurately the ―desire‖ or ―intention‖ to have children, since 
the  size  of  the  gap  varies  considerably  according  to  the  measurements  used.  The  second 
challenge concerns the interpretation of this gap, since it may refer to constraints that are 
internalized  by  individuals.  Thus,  a  respondent‘s  answer  on  fertility  intentions  is  very 
sensitive  to  how  the  question  is  formulated.  Moreover,  intentions  may  vary  considerably 
according to the institutional and policy context, so interpreting the gap between intended and 
actual fertility is a delicate issue. 
Recent surveys conducted in Europe show large differences in the ideal number of children 
across the EU members (Testa, 2006). France is among the countries where this ―ideal‖ is the 
highest (2.66 compared to the EU-15 average of 2.29 (only Ireland has a higher number with 
2.80,  Denmark  comes  a  close  third  with  2.63),  whereas  some  countries  like  Austria,  are 
characterized  by  a  below-replacement  family  size  ideal.  The  author  also  estimates  the 
―ultimately intended family size‖ by summing the number of children already born and those 
that individuals still intend to have in the future, and measures the gap between actual and 
intended family size. France ranks sixth among the EU-15 member states. However, some 
authors like Lutz (2007) argue that the gap vanishes in certain countries when tempo-adjusted 
period fertility rates are used. That is the case in Austria, for instance, but not in France. 
One reason for this gap may be related to the growing perception that fertility can be 
planned, even if not perfectly controlled. The legalization of abortion and the dissemination of 
contraception during the past forty years have certainly boosted this perception. In the late 
1960s, 15% of pregnancies resulting in a birth were intended, and the proportion of planned 
births rose from 59% in 1970 to 83% in 1995. Prospective parents now expect to choose not 
only the number of children, but the timing of their births. Régnier-Loilier and Léridon (2007) 
consider  that  the  intervals  between  successive  births  are  now  rarely  left  to  chance.  For 
example, closely-spaced births are unusual. Whereas in the mid 1960s, almost one second 
birth in five occurred in the calendar year following the first birth, the proportion fell to 10% 
in the early 1980s and to 8% ten years later (Prioux, 1994). 
Yet  control  over  fertility  is  by  no  means  perfect,  since  the  share  of  ―unintended‖ 
pregnancies remains very high in France. When assessing the effectiveness of birth control, 
the  number  of  abortions  must  also  be  taken  into  account,  after  which  about  36%  of 
pregnancies  may  be  estimated  as  ―unintended‖.  In  a  survey  on  the  analysis  of  fertility 
intentions, Toulemon and Testa (2005) found that the majority of individuals (58.5%) were 
hesitant  about  their  intentions  to  have  children.  Altogether  6  respondents  in  10  reported 
having no firm childbearing intention in the next five years. Thus, intentions are only one 





































9  239 
of intentions varies with the level of education: higher educated individuals seem to benefit 
from better conditions in which to fulfil their intentions, or they anticipate their behaviour 
better (five years later 63% had realized the intentions they had reported in 1998, compared 
with 48% for the population as a whole). 
To summarize, France has relatively high fertility at near-replacement rate and the 
TFR has been rising since the mid 1990s. This is a rather singular trend with respect to the 
other countries of continental Europe. Motherhood is clearly postponed but less so than in 
many European countries. However, the recent rebound in total fertility rates is clearly due to 
the process of birth postponement. For completed fertility, the gap between the rate recorded 
for the baby-boomers and for younger cohorts is about half a child (2.6 children per woman 
born in 1940, more than 2.1 per woman born in the 1960s). However, younger cohorts seem 
likely to achieve a level that is scarcely lower, so cohort fertility should remain stable at 
around  (or  a  little  above)  2.0  children  per  woman,  while  the  mother‘s  age  at  birth  has 
increased. 
Childlessness  among  French  women  is  significantly  less  frequent  than  in  other 
European countries, and the proportion of families with three children or more still remains 
higher than in most European countries despite a more habitual restriction of family size to 
two children. For the cohorts born after 1945, the distribution of family size was very stable, 
with  about  10%  of  women  remaining  childless,  20%  having  one  child,  40%  having  two 
children, 20% having three and 10% having four children or more. 
Despite this apparent stability, a gap continues to exist, at aggregate level, between 
actual fertility behaviour and intentions. Part of this gap may certainly be attributed to the 
obstacles that prevent individuals from realizing their intentions. Clearly, government policies 
are among the factors that can help to tackle these obstacles. They may even contribute to the 
shaping of fertility intentions. 
II.  A Family-friendly State  
II.1.  High investment, but diverse objectives 
It is a well-documented fact that family policy has a long history in France and that 
fertility has traditionally been a political concern
1. Compared to other OECD countries, public 
investment in families with children is relatively high. France even exhibits the highest scores 
in 2005, with about  3.8%  of GDP  spent in family benefits, cash payments, spending on 
services and tax breaks for families, compared to the average of 2.4% (Durand et al., 2009).  
This situation is the result of a longstanding historical process, which has led to a compromise 
between various political ideologies and objectives. This compromise remains rooted in a 
dual historical tradition: on the one hand family policy that began with the protection of 
children and assistance to children of deprived families, and on the other, the new post-World 
War II framework for social protection which made a point of safeguarding the incomes of 
families with children (and large families especially) (Damon, 2006). The issue of fertility is 
also a traditional underlying concern, but in the past decade it has been partly reshaped by the 
issue of reconciling the work-life balance. As a consequence of these developments, current 
family  policy  is  a  compromise  between  different  objectives  and  has  inevitably  become 
somewhat ambiguous (Thévenon, 2006).  
                                                 
1 This may also explain the growing complexity of the French system of assistance to families. As quoted by 
Fagnani (2006), ―successive government attempts to simplify the family benefit system have resulted in only 
piecemeal measures which have reinforced rather than reduced complexity. As a result, French family policy is 
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Current  family  policies  in  France  are  characterized  by  four  salient  features.  First, 
support is still primarily designed to alleviate the impact of children on the standard of living 
of households, and thus benefits all families including the richer ones. Growing concerns 
about employment, gender equality, child poverty and so forth have, however, progressively 
reshaped the scope and content of family policy for reconciling work and family life. In this 
perspective, children now have access to childcare services and preschool from a very young 
age and this early access is expected to benefit the development of children, their school 
achievement  and  to  help  parents  balance  work  and  family  life.  As  a  consequence, 
expenditures in childcare and early education services score at a relatively high level: 1.6% of 
GDP compared to the OECD average of 0.87%. Nevertheless, the development of support 
over the last decades has been driven by the aim of fostering a strategy of dual choice: the 
―choice‖ for parents (actually women) with children under preschool age to stay at home or 
go out to work; the ―choice‖ of the mode of childcare for working parents with pre-school 
children. Working parents with young children consequently benefit from a continuum of 
support in cash and services. By contrast, the support received by working parents from their 
employer appears to be comparatively limited (Adema and Thévenon, 2008).  
All  in  all,  the  package  of  support  received  by  families  from  the  state  is  very 
comprehensive in comparison to other countries. However, although the amount spent for all 
families is quantitatively quite considerable, the level and type of support actually received 
vary considerably with the socioeconomic status of the family.  
II.2.  Income protection and fertility: two early family policy 
objectives 
 
As already stated, income transfers via the tax and benefit system constitute the first 
pillar of support received by families. Cash family benefits are important since they represent 
about half the benefits paid to families (Chart 7). They were introduced with the new social 
protection system in 1945 in a form that has hardly changed up to the present. Only families 
with at least two children receive the fixed, non means-tested benefits. The amount per child 
increases with the number of children, and a variety of pre- and post-birth payments are also 
included. Transfers to families are also made through income tax reduction via the ―quotient 
familial‖ mechanism (a coefficient which operates by reducing the household‘s income tax 
according to the number of children) introduced into the income tax system in 1945. The 
transfers constitute an important share of the support provided to families since they represent 
about  0.7%  of  GDP  —  equivalent  to  one  third  of  the  total  spending  on  families.  This 
mechanism was designed to reduce the cost of raising children and provides tax reductions 
that  are  particularly  large  for  families  with  at  least  three  children  or  more.  Since  tax 
reductions are proportional to the basic taxable income, the quotient familial is especially 
beneficial to large richer families (see Box 1). It was explicitly designed as an incentive to 
boost fertility, and in particular to increase the propensity to have a third child (Thélot and 
Villac,  1998).  The  pro-natalist  argument  continues  to  shape  state  family  policy,  although 
recent surveys have shown that this is no longer very well perceived in public opinion, and 
that greater emphasis is now placed on the notion of children‘s rights (Letablier et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the above-mentioned changes in fertility and conjugal behaviour (illustrated by the 
transition to the two-child norm and the increase in the number of single parents) have given 
rise to debate on the appropriateness of the family benefit concept and the quotient familial. 
Despite  some  attempts  at  reform,  up  to  now  no  consensus  has  emerged  that  will 
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In the period just after World War II, support was mainly focused on large families 
and based on a traditional male-breadwinner household. The 1970s were characterized by the 
increase in  assistance to  families  with  temporary  economic or social  difficulties  and new 
benefits were created to help people facing social or family problems. These were reserved for 
a specific population and were means-tested. Lone parents with children under the age of 3 
could claim for a single-parent benefit called Allocation pour Parent Isolé (API). Housing 
benefits were also created during the 1970s, with amounts depending on the composition of 
the family. In 1972, a childcare benefit for working mothers was also established. The end of 
the 1970s marked a turning point, and the focus of family policies gradually shifted  away 
from fertility to the issue of reconciling work and family life. 
Box 1: Family-based tax allowances in France 
This mechanism, original to France, is a ―family ratio‖ (―quotient familial‖) used to calculate income tax. Its 
basic purpose is to compensate for the cost of children by taking the presence of a partner and children into 
account in the calculation of income tax
2. The quotient familial operates as follows: total household income is 
divided by the number of ―adult equivalents‖ in the household, and the relevant tax rate is applied to this income 
per adult equivalent. The resulting tax rate is then applied to household income according to the following rules:  
     - If R is the household‘s taxable income; 
     - calculate a number N of units depending on the family size: one unit for each adult (either married or in 
registered partnership), 0.5 units for each child up to parity 2, one unit for each child after the third child or for 
the first child of a single-parent family (usually); 
    - the ―family ratio‖ Q is equal to R divided by N; 
    - the marginal income tax t is an increasing function of Q, and not of R; 
    - the tax T owed by the household is equal to : t(Q)*R-v(Q)*N, where v(Q) is determined to ensure that there 
is no discontinuity in the function T(R) when N remains constant. Note also that t is progressive. 
Thus, for households with the same income level, a family with three children will pay less than a family with 
only one child. The tax incentive to families is more than just a lump sum tax reduction per child – as would be 
the case if t and v depended on R and not on Q – but increases with the income R. An extra child gives rise to a 
lump-sum tax reduction (0.5*v(Q) or v(Q) according to the birth order of the new child, plus a reduction  of t(Q) 
since Q decreases. However, the “quotient familial” is not a tax credit as such: low income households who are 
exempt from income tax do not benefit from it at all, and households paying low income tax receive only a small 
tax  reduction.  Hence,  because  of  its  counter-redistributive  effects,  there  is  a  ceiling  for  the  tax  reduction 
generated by the ―family ratio‖: € 2,200 a year for a first or second child in 2007, €4,400 a year for a child of 
parity 3 and above or for the first child of a one-parent family.  
Using micro-simulation models, the total ―cost‖ – or rather loss to the government budget – of the “quotient 
familial” was estimated at 0.7 % of GDP in 2004, or one third of the total amount of cash benefits for families. 
This confirms the crucial role played by the “quotient familial” in reducing the financial burden of families. 
Further tax reduction is granted to compensate for ‗external‘ childcare costs, when the household makes use of a 
childminder or a day nursery. A total of 25% of childcare costs paid by parents can be deducted from their tax 
bill, up to a limit of €575 per child under age7.  
Households recruiting a home care assistant can also deduct 50% of their expenses, up to a limit of €10,000 
(€20,000 for people with disabilities), thereby reducing their tax bill by up to €5,000. 
 
                                                 
2 The rationale for this mechanism lies in the 13th article of the Declaration of Human and Citizen‘s Rights of 
1789, which is incorporated in the current French Constitution. This article states that tax owed by households 
must  depend  not  just  on  income,  but  on  their  ―contributory  capacity‖.  This  notion  has  traditionally  been 
interpreted as imposing a tax schedule that takes family size into account, and the French Constitutional Court 
has regularly reminded Parliament that it cannot create a new tax or change an existing one without taking into 
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II.3.  A growing but ambiguous focus on the work-life 
balance 
Support to working mothers was developed in an ambivalent context caught between 
two movements: one that promoted family values and focused on large, traditional families, 
and the other, feminist, movement that advocated the individualization of social rights and the 
participation  of  women  in  the  labour  market  (Commaille  et  al.,  2002;  Revillard,  2006; 
Fagnani, 2008). The issue of reconciling work and family life developed during the 1970s and 
1980s. It added the development of childcare services as an objective, alongside the education 
and development of children. Nevertheless, support to working women developed without 
clear focus, notably because family policies remained in force throughout and were conducted 
independently of policies for women‘s rights and gender equality (Strobel, 2004). 
This ambiguity grew during the 1980s and 1990s because family policy evolved in a 
context of severe budgetary restrictions, and was more directly subordinated to employment 
concerns.  Some  authors  even  argue  that  family  policy  was  progressively  shaped  as  an 
instrument of employment policies on two fronts: unemployment and the development of 
domestic and personal services (Martin et al., 1997; Fagnani, 2007). The Allocation Parentale 
d‟Education  was  created  to  encourage  working  mothers  to  leave  the  labour  market 
temporarily  for  childrearing  (and  thus  reduce  the  job  queue).  Depending  on  their  prior 
activity, mothers with 3 children could obtain a fixed allowance if they stopped working or 
switched  to  part-time  work  until  their  youngest  child‘s  third  birthday.  This  benefit  was 
extended to mothers with 2 children from 1994. The 2004 reform of the Prestation d‟Accueil 
du Jeune Enfant (PAJE) enables parents to interrupt their employment from the birth of the 
first child for a period of up to six months, with the possibility of extending this to three years 
for a second or a third child, in which case the parents receive the Complément de Libre Choix 
d‟Activité (CLCA), a monthly parental care allowance of €522. Although the PAJE is only 
provided for six months, the extension of parental leave support for the first child represents a 
significant paradigm change, since policies prior to that reform aimed rather at postponing the 
decision to resume work or stay at home only after a second or a third birth
3 (Thévenon, 
2006).  By  contrast,  women  with  one  child  were  encouraged  to  remain  in  (full -time) 
employment, thanks to a high level of support through childcare and preschool services. In 
2005, the amount spent on parental leave benefit (APE and CLCA) represented 9% of family 
support,  approximately  the same as  the total amount  spent on  childcare  and  preschool 
structures by the state and the municipalities (Figure 6).  
                                                 
3 Note also that parents with a third child can also opt for the Complément Optionel de Libre Choix d‟Activité 
(COLCA),  introduced  in  2006,  that  allows  parents  to  leave  their  employment  for  a  shorter  period  (1  year 
compared to the 3 years of the CLCA) with a higher payment. The parent must choose his/her option before the 
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Parental leave benefit (9%) Support for employed home care (10%)
Maternity/paternity leave (8%) Family benefits (53%)
Social assistance (Lone parents, Disabled adults) (11%) Tax credit for employers (0.1%)
State Investment in childcare and preschool (3%) City spending in childcare structures (6%)
 
Income tax relief is not included in this distribution. 
Source: authors‘ calculations from data reported in CAS (2007), Rapport sur un service public pour la 
petite enfance, http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_SPPE_VF14022007-2.pdf.  
In parallel, individualized and flexible home care services were developed, supported 
by tax reductions for households employing family carers at home, thereby reducing the cost 
of  childcare  and  creating  employment.  Subsidized  childminders,  allowances  and  tax 
reductions for households paying childcare costs, were also introduced in the early 1980s. 
Since 1980, an allowance has been paid to families with children aged under 3 (later extended 
to children under 6) who are cared for by a registered childminder. In 1986, a tax allowance 
was introduced for families who employ nannies in their own home, i.e. richer families than 
those relying on the local day nursery or a registered childminder. Such parents are eligible to 
deduct half the cost of childcare from their taxable income. This mechanism provides sizeable 
support to families since it represents about 10% of their spending on childcare. In 2005, 
about  45%  of  children  from  birth  to  3  years  were  beneficiaries  of  individual  childcare 
benefits. 
 
II.4.  Greater support for the poorest and richest families… 
This brief historical presentation shows that transfers are multi-oriented. Some recent 
papers  have  attempted  to  evaluate  how  they  benefit  families  with  children  compared  to 
childless households. Overall they show that transfers are larger for families with a youngest 
child aged under 3, and more generous for bigger, better-off families. Across all families, the 
average amount of child-related transfers is U-shaped (Figure 7; Bechtel, 2005): low-income 
families  receive a higher amount per child than median earners, basically because of the 
means test for the basic PAJE allowance but also because they receive higher amounts of 
social and housing assistance. By contrast, the tax-relief mechanism of the ―quotient familial‖ 
is clearly beneficial to richer households, and explains why the average support per child is 
much  higher  for  them.  In  comparison  with  other  OECD  countries,  the  ratio  of  transfers 
received by low-income families in France compared with high income ones is relatively low 
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income before transfers  (brackets  of initial income)
Average amount of transfers per child (by brackets of initial income)
Family benefits Tax breaks Social assistance and housing benefit Total
All families
Families with children 
(youngest <3 years old) Families without children under age 3
Source: Bechtel et al. (2005); Simulation of the legislation in 2004 with income in 2001. 
 
II.5.  … and to households with children under 3 years old 
and larger families  
Globally,  transfers  received  by  families  help  reduce  the  income  gap  between 
households with and without children, and thus contribute to reducing income inequalities as 
well  as  the  poverty  rate.  This  fell  to  7.2%  after  transfers  to  families  with  children  were 
introduced, from 21% before (Courtioux et al., 2005). In the case of households with a child 
under age three, child support has increased together with primary income, as a result of the 
tax reduction for childcare costs. Because support increases with the number of children, 
transfers  are  greater  for  large  families  in  France  at  all  income  levels,  whereas  they  are 
proportional  to  the  number  of  children  in  the  majority  of  European  countries  (Math  and 
Meilland, 2007). 
Figure  8  compares  the  progressive  increase  in  support  according  to  the  different 
childcare solutions, by household income. It clearly illustrates the sharp increase in household 
income thanks to the childcare allowance when parents employ a registered childminder. For 
one-child  families,  the  average  support  is  clearly  higher  than  the  home-care  allowance 
(CLCA)  for  most  households,  whatever  their  position  in  the  distribution  of  income.  By 
contrast, the figure changes for families with two (or three) children: households in the first 
four deciles of income gain far more from the home-care allowance than from the benefits 
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Income before transfers  (by brackets)
Average amount per child
Couples with children below 3 years old
Couples with 1 child Couples with 2 children Couples with 3 children
Total Child care 
support 
Parental care allowance 
(Complement Libre Choix 
d'Activité)
Parental care allowance 
(Complement Libre Choix 
d'Activité)
Individual childcare  
benefit(Basis )




For details about the items, see box 2. 
Source: Bechtel et al. (2005); Simulation of the 2004 legislation with income in 2001. 
II.6.  Comprehensive provision of childcare services to 
reconcile work and family life.  
Excluding tax allowances for childcare costs, the effective tax rate of a second worker 
in the household is clearly below the OECD average, but the incentive for a second worker 
rather than an increase in the first earners‘ labour supply is especially low, given the ―quotient 
conjugal‖ mechanism. The net cost paid by two working parents with two children using full-
time  care  is,  in  terms  of  percentage  of  household  net  income,  about  the  OECD  average 
(Barber and Immervoll, 2005). Nevertheless, tax breaks contribute to reducing childcare costs 
and levelling the differences between the cost of a place in a day nursery and the employment 
of a registered childminder. 
This  support  improves  the  work-life  balance  and  complements  the  relatively 
comprehensive provision of childcare services  provided by the system of public  day care 
centres,  as  well  as  the  early  enrolment  of  children  in  preschool  (écoles  maternelles).  As 
already stated, investment in early childhood services is comparatively high in France, and 
represents almost one tenth of the total amount spent on families (Figure 6). Moreover, day 
nurseries accept infants into day care immediately after the end of maternity leave, i.e. from 
the age of two or three months, and are open for most of the day (7-8am to 6-7 pm). That is 
very different from the situation in the Nordic countries, for instance, where collective public 
care services only become available once the child is one year old. 
Although day care centres are open to infants from very young ages, their effective 
contribution to childcare of children under preschool age remains quite limited in comparison 
to the other formal or informal childcare solutions. A 2002 survey on childcare estimated that 
only 10% of children under three are enrolled in day care centres, while most of them (61%) 
are looked after mainly by their parents during weekdays, 21% are cared for by subsidized 
childminders, 7% by grand-parents and only 1% by nannies at home (Blanpain, 2006). 
By contrast, nursery schools (écoles maternelles) are certainly a key component of 
overall child care provision. They were created in 1881, and considerable investments were 
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preschool  capacity  since  it  is  relatively  cheap  compared  to  the  cost  of  other  childcare 
solutions (Adema and Thévenon, 2008). These nursery schools are free of charge for parents 
(except for lunch) and often accept children from age two. They provide care support to 
working parents and are relatively compatible with full-time work since children are in school 
from  8.30-9 am  to  11h30-12 pm, then from  1.30 to  4.30 pm.  Most  nursery schools  also 
provide lunch and care after school hours (until 6-6.30 pm).  
The role of preschools is confirmed by the fact that about 37% of children are enrolled 
in preschool at age 2 and 97% from age 3.  There is universal coverage at age 4 — combined 
with other childcare solutions since only 14% of two-year olds attend school on a full-time 
basis, and 21% on a part-time basis. Most children can attend after-school care from 4.30 pm 
to 6-6.30 pm, but about two thirds of 2-6 year-old children are cared for by their parents after 
school and only 17% use the after-school care facilities. 
The contribution of the school system to childcare extends beyond preschool. School 
days are relatively long in France compared with other European countries, and out-of-school 
care is frequently provided (Ananian and Bauer, 2007). In all, 56% of children in primary and 
secondary school have lunch at school, and 21% attend after-school care. The use of out-of-
school care is especially frequent among women who work on Wednesdays (French nursery 
and primary schools are closed on Wednesdays). However, about one in five women care for 
their children on Wednesday even when they work all, and almost 27% of school-age children 
are cared for by their grand parents or another family member. 
To summarize, one of the main characteristics of French family policy is the U-shaped 
financial support to families. It includes some anti-redistributive effects but has contributed to 
lowering the poverty rate of families with children to 7.2%, compared with a rate of 21% 
before the transfers were introduced. Income support is higher for families with three or more 
children,  whereas  support  is  generally  proportional  to  the  number  of  children  in  other 
European countries. Furthermore, comprehensive and diversified support for childcare is also 
granted  to  families  with  children  aged  under  3  through  the  provision  of  childcare  and 
preschool services early in the child life-cycle, but also through subsidies for the various 
childcare  solutions.  However,  this  variety  of  measures  is  not  sufficient  to  alleviate  the 
inequalities in childcare support or in the use of paid assistance. Thus, women in the lower 
range of household income distribution are clearly encouraged to withdraw from the labour 
market  to  care  for  their  children,  while  those  with  higher  earning  potential  benefit  from 
greater support to employ nannies and stay in employment.  
 
II.3.  The impact of policies on fertility and the work-life 
balance 
Basically, family-friendly policies are expected to impact fertility because they reduce 
the cost of having children and improve the work–life balance. These policies include a large 
range  of  institutional  instruments  including  tax  credits,  cash  benefits,  and  other  financial 
transfers that aim to limit the potential loss of well-being that the presence of children may 
produce in a household. Some benefits or transfers provide specific assistance for low-income 
families or support for housing; others are directed at helping parents to reconcile work and 
family life, while benefits and tax allowances can be designed to help families meet childcare 
costs. Childcare services and parental leave provisions are also of prime importance in giving 
parents the opportunity to combine employment with family and care responsibilities, and 
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labour  market  impact  both  the  direct  and  the  opportunity  costs  of  children.  In  this  case, 
policies can create reverse incentives on childbearing. 
III.1.  Some difficulties in measuring policy impact 
 In spite of these contrasting expected effects, cross-country analyses suggest that total 
fertility rates are higher in countries with wider childcare availability, lower direct cost of  
having children, higher part-time availability of parents and longer parental leave. However, it 
is difficult to evaluate the precise impact of each of policy variable. For instance, it is difficult 
to measure and define the scope and boundaries of policies (Gauthier, 2007). One might argue 
that  in  some  cases  the  whole  institutional  setting,  rather  than  specific  policies,  make  the 
country more child- or fertility-friendly. Thus, the conventional limits of policies must be 
narrowed in order to make meaningful cross-country comparisons, or broadened in order to 
capture any systemic coherence between them that is not underpinned by the same goals but 
may be of importance in reconciling fertility decisions with other aspects of life. 
Another challenge is to capture the potentially complementary nature of instruments, 
i.e. the fact that one instrument has an effective impact only if combined with another, or if 
the associated support exceeds a given threshold. The effectiveness of policy instruments may 
depend on the existence of multi-faceted and combined support in cash, services and time 
provided  continuously  over  the  childhood  period  to  address  the  different  aspects  of 
childrearing and the evolution of needs over the family life-cycle. However, few quantified 
data on how such institutional complementarities affect fertility behaviour are available as 
yet. Econometric evidence of the impact of specific policy initiatives is much more abundant. 
Assessing this impact is a challenging task, however:  
  First, there are obvious time lags in the adjustment of reproductive behaviour 
to policy changes, and such lags make it difficult to assign the impact of specific instruments 
or specific policy changes to the changes that can be observed.  
  A related issue is that short-term impacts can be identified quite easily, while 
long term effects are more difficult to apprehend. For example, it is difficult to know whether 
policy changes will impact only the timing of birth or also the completed fertility rates. This is 
important to acknowledge, however, since there seems to be no deterministic relation between 
the changes in birth timing and the evolution of fertility rates in European countries (Sobotka 
and Toulemon, 2008). 
  Thirdly, both fertility and labour market behaviours are decided simultaneously 
and this may induce some endogenous explanatory variables, such as mothers‘ labour supply. 
This problem is now treated quite effectively when longitudinal data are available. 
  A fourth difficulty lies in estimating the exact degree to which policy measures 
compensate  for  the  cost  of  children,  a  factor  which  varies  according  to  the  household‘s 
economic and demographic situations. Most cross-country comparisons do not account for 
such inter-group heterogeneity and focus on average values. However, policy impact may 
vary across socio-demographic groups, such as ethnic group or socioeconomic status, and also 
according to the type of relationship between the parents (Sleebos, 2003). There may even be 
a polarized attitude or reaction to policies. The impact of policies also varies by birth parity, 
although most papers focus on aggregates figures. 
  Another related issue is to define the scope of policy measures since these can 
impact the behaviour of population subgroups not directly targeted by the measures. As we 
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impact on the behaviour of both smaller and larger families. Moreover, very active policies, 
even targeting specific population groups, may act as a signal  of support to families and 
influence a larger proportion of families by contagion. Differences-in-differences estimation 
is weakened in the presence of such a process. 
  This possibility leads to a sixth difficulty: the potential endogeneity of policies. 
The development of family policies can surely boost fertility, but they may also be developed 
as a consequence of such a boost. Evidence from long-term series, for example in Sweden, 
shows that childcare policy has been developed in parallel to the expansion of female labour 
participation, but was not a pre-requisite to it (OECD, 2005).  
  Last but not least, financial incentives are certainly not the only policy channel 
for impacting fertility decisions, and the other channels should be considered when evaluating 
fertility responses to policies and institutions. For instance, one effect of institutions is to 
reduce  uncertainty  and  to  enable  people  to  make  long-term  commitments  (such  as 
childbearing). However, several conditions need to be met for them to have such an effect. 
Long-lasting policies are necessary in order to maintain people‘s trust and convince them that 
no profound changes will occur in the future. Continuous and diversified policies are also 
needed to  guarantee long-term support and create ‗systemic‘ coherence.  The existence of 
coherent support, balancing benefits in cash and in kind, and providing continuous support to 
parents as their children grow up is certainly a precondition for effective policies. This is a 
key aspect in explaining France‘s performance, and goes beyond direct financial incentives. 
III.2.  Some evidence from comparative studies: from the impact 
of financial incentives to the assessment of work-life balance 
policies  
Given these obstacles, assessing the exact impact of family policies on fertility is an 
intricate business. One approach is to make cross-country comparisons that investigate the 
effect of policies on fertility rates in industrialized countries. Most of these studies consider 
the aggregated level of TFR, and merge the data for all countries, even if they allow country-
specific effects. They use either time-series cross-section data or longitudinal data.  
In a survey published in 2003, Sleebos asserted that findings are often inconclusive or 
contradictory,  partly  because  of  methodological  differences.  However,  a  review  of  these 
studies suggests a positive but weak relationship between reproductive behaviour and family 
policy. The same dubitative statement is reiterated by Gauthier (2007). One obvious reason 
for the lack of evidence is that the influence of policies can only be detected in the long-term. 
However, both authors point out that the more obvious and robust results concern the impact 
of  cash  benefit  and  transfers,  whereas  the  impact  of  work-related  policies  is  more 
contradictory:  the  duration  and  payment  of  maternity  leave  generally  have  a  rather  weak 
impact, whereas some studies conclude that childcare availability and/or affordability have a 
greater  one.  Flexible  working  hours  and  the  availability  of  part-time  work  are  important 
factors  influencing  fertility.  Thus,  a  key  issue  for  fertility  decisions  appears  to  be  the 
possibility of combining a career and a family. For that reason, attention should be paid to 
policies that aim at reconciling work and family life. 
Among the most significant studies assessing the impact of cash transfers, Blanchet 
and  Ekert-Jaffé  (1994)  investigate  the  effect  of  family  benefits  on  the  TFR  of  11 
industrialized countries in the period from 1970 to 1983. They constructed a family policy 
index that measures the global generosity of financial support through cash benefits, tax relief 
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that French family policy could lead to an extra 0.17 child per women compared with other 
developed countries such as the UK. Such an impact is not insignificant, but shows that cross-
national differences in fertility level are only very partially explained by differences in cash 
support to families. Moreover, no major fertility upswing may be expected from such support. 
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) modelled the dynamic relation between fertility rates and 
policies  for  22  OECD  countries  over  the  period  1970-1990.  They  found  that  neither  the 
duration of benefits nor the amount of benefits appeared to be significantly related to fertility. 
By contrast, direct cash benefits were found to have a positive and significant effect, albeit a 
small one. The authors also considered the differences in policy impact according to birth 
parity and found that benefits had a greater effect for the first child. One of their conclusions 
was that targeting benefits on the third child, as is the case in France, is unlikely to increase 
fertility. Overall, the magnitude of the effect is therefore small, since they estimate that a 25% 
increase  in  family  allowances  would  result  in  an  average  fertility  increase  of  about  0.07 
children  per  woman.  However,  they  also  observed  differences  in  responsiveness  across 
groups of countries. Basically, a greater impact was found in Scandinavian countries and was 
interpreted as the effect of the co-variation of in-kind support in these countries. Thus the 
authors  (indirectly)  stress  the  importance  of  institutional  complementarities  although  they 
could not quantify them directly.  
Comparing changes in cross-section data, Castles (2003) argues that the provision of 
child-care facilities for children aged 0-3, which is crucial to early re-entry into the labour 
force, may have been the main factor contributing to the reversal of the relationship between 
fertility rates and female labour market participation in OECD countries. Micro-evaluation 
evidence  is,  however,  less  conclusive.  While  a  positive  impact  on  fertility  of  reduced 
childcare cost and increased childcare availability was estimated by Di Prete et al. (2003) and 
Del Boca et al. (2007), no statistically significant impact on childcare characteristics was 
reported for example by Ronsen (2004) for Norway and Finland, Hank and Kreyenfed (2003) 
for Germany or by Andersson et al. (2004) for Sweden. 
More  recent  studies  confirm  the  impact  of  standard  family  policies  and  provide 
evidence  of  their  effect  on  the  labour  market  and  work  organization.  D‘Addio  and  Mira 
d‘Ercole  (2005)  analysed  cross-country  differences  in  total  fertility  rates  in  1999  for  19 
OECD countries. Their investigation was based on models that allow for dynamic effects, 
potential  heterogeneity  between  countries,  and  endogeneity  of  some  of  the  explanatory 
variables. They find evidence that transfers to families with children, as well as the provision 
of services to working parents to help them cope with care responsibilities, have a positive 
impact on childbearing. The impact is, however, relatively weak: a one-week  increase in the 
total length of parental leave would on average increase the total fertility rate by 0.3%
4 (when 
the impact is estimated with pool mean grou p estimators including time effect). A  1-unit 
increase in the percentage of wages replaced during maternity leave or in the income transfers 
to families  produces an  increase  in TFR of  0.9% and 1% respectively
5. The  study also 
suggested that an increase in  female labour market participation,  in the share of women in 
                                                 
4 The interpretation of this result is not straightforward, however, since  leave provisions are often longer in 
countries with fewer out-of-home caring facilities. These facilities are not included in the model because of lack 
of time series data. 
5 Net transfers to families with children are computed as the difference between the average effective tax rates of 
singles without children earning the average wage and a married couple with two children aged 6 and 4, where 
one spouse earns the average wage. The estimated impact means here that an increase in transfers to families by 
25% translated on average into a lon g-run increase of 0.005 c hildren per women. This increase is half -way 
between the increases of 0.04 children per women (following a 25% increase in the family benefit index) in 
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part-time work, and in the ratio of female to male hourly earnings all have a positive impact 
on fertility.  
Del  Boca  et  al.  (2007)  also  modelled  the  role of  childcare  arrangements,  parental 
leave,  family  allowances  and  labour  market  flexibility,  but  adopted  an  individual-based 
approach by and on women‘s fertility and labour supply decisions. Their results, based on the 
ECHP, show that a non-negligible portion of the differences in labour force participation and 
fertility rates of women in six European countries (including France) can be attributed to 
institutional  differences,  but  the  impact  varies  according  to  educational  levels.  Childcare 
availability and optional leave have larger impacts on fertility and participation decisions at 
lower  educational  levels.  The  parameter  significance  on  fertility  is,  however,  weak.  By 
contrast,  labour  market  policies,  such  as  opportunities  for  part-time  employment  have  a 
greater impact on women with higher education. In all cases, the impact is more significant 
and stronger on labour supply than on fertility. 
When assessing the effectiveness of policies in raising fertility levels, an important 
issue is also to determine whether these policies impact the ―completed‖ fertility rates or only 
the timing of births. In the first case, policies would have a long-term effect, but in the second 
only a temporary one. Studies that distinguish between the two using age- and parity-specific 
fertility rates, tend to conclude that the impact is more significant on the timing of fertility 
than on the total number of children (Sleebos, 2003). For example, Andersson (2001) suggests 
that  the  introduction  of  a  ―speed  premium‖  in  the  Swedish  parental  leave  system  has 
accelerated childbearing decisions by reducing the spacing between first and second births. 
III.3.  Some evidence for France from the  literature on fertility 
and female labour market behaviour 
Only  a  limited  number  of  the  papers  investigating  the  impact  of  family-oriented 
policies on fertility in France can be used to interpret the above-mentioned specificities in 
fertility trends. Contrary to the comparative studies we have discussed, most of the analyses 
on France are based on micro-behaviour and individual data. Some of these studies have 
focused  on  the  impact  of  income  support  on  fertility.  They  consider  either  total  income 
support taken as a whole, or the impact of tax breaks on fertility. Other, more recent studies 
have considered the effect of specific work-related policy measures on fertility and female 
labour market participation. In particular, many studies have focused on the  effect of the 
parental leave benefit (the APE) on female labour market behaviour, but only one has focused 
on childbearing. Many studies also analyse the impact of childcare characteristics (cost and 
availability) on the female labour supply but, to our knowledge, none have investigated their 
specific  impact  on  fertility.  Nevertheless,  these  papers  shed  light  on  the  relatively 
comprehensive support that has helped many women combine full-time work with the birth of 
a  first  child.  Policies  that  reconcile  labour  market  participation  and  first  motherhood  do 
appear to be very important. There are, however, no studies specifically investigating the role 
of flexible working hours or part-time work on fertility. 
III.4.  A limited impact of financial incentives, except for higher 
parity births 
Ekert  (1986)  was  among  the  first  to  estimate  the  impact  of  financial  (non  work-
related)  transfers  to  families  on  fertility.  She  evaluated  the  effect  of  direct  cash  benefits 
(including the ―universal‖ allocations familiales, the means-tested complément familial, and 
housing benefits) on fertility in the late 1970s and observed a significant but limited impact 
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estimated  that  full  payment  of  child-related  costs  would  increase  fertility  by  a  mere  0.3 
children per woman. As stated previously, Blanchet and Ekert (1994) found a similar impact 
from a cross-country comparison.  
Ekert et al. (2002) also suggested that family policy is an important factor that reduces 
differences in fertility behaviour between socio-occupational categories, especially compared 
with countries like the UK. Nevertheless, the majority of women become mothers in France, 
and the propensity to have a second child depends very little on social categories. In the UK, 
where support for families and working mothers is far less developed, the polarization of 
fertility behaviour across social groups is far more pronounced, and starts from the first child. 
A more recent paper by Landais (2003) scrutinizes the impact of the quotient familial 
on fertility at parity 3. To do so, he estimated the impact of a 1981 change in tax legislation 
that considered a third child as a full adult for tax purposes, instead of half an adult in the tax  
allowance calculation (see box 1). He also concluded that there was a positive but very weak 
impact: a 1% variation in tax allowances for households with two children produced a relative 
proportionate increase of less than 0.05% in the probability of transition to a third child. 
Landais also observed that the sensitivity of fertility behaviour to tax incentives increases 
with income (and thus the size of the incentive). There is, however, a time lag of between 5 
and 10 years before the effects are fully disseminated and can be evaluated. 
III.5.  The 1994 parental leave reform: a limited (positive) impact 
on fertility… 
Breton and Prioux (2005) also investigated the role of family policies on the transition 
from  two  to  three  children  and  looked  at  trends  in  a  more  long-term  perspective.  They 
concluded that the measures targeting the third child had a visible impact on birth timing. 
These measures may also have contributed to the stability or even the slight increase in the 
probability  of  having  a  third  child,  especially  with  the  Allocation  Parentale  d‟Education 
introduced in 1985. This probability has decreased as support policy has moved from focusing 
on the third birth to the second. The authors observed roughly the same cyclical variations in 
the probability of having a second and third child during the 1970-2000 period, but a greater 
magnitude of variations when support for 3-child families was increased in the early 1980s. 
However, they could not quantify this impact without predicting what would have happened 
without the policy changes. Observing the relatively similar cyclical trends of the probability 
of having a child at parity 2 and 3, they suggested that policy may have had an impact beyond 
its target (families with 3 children), i.e. on fertility behaviour at lower parity, by the contagion 
effect  from  the  secure  climate  created  by  the  policy  and  the  widespread  communication 
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Laroque and Salanié (2004; 2005; 2008) investigated the role of financial incentives 
through tax and benefit transfers received by families. They used a micro-simulation model 
with  endogenous  female  labour  force  participation  and  the  fertility  response  to  financial 
incentives. However, their three papers produced rather different and sometimes contradictory 
results. Basically, Laroque and Salanié (2005) stressed two main differences between their 
first  and  second  papers.  The  first  was  that  the  time  horizon  of  benefit  receipt  was  not 
sufficiently taken into account. Second was that they included fewer variables in the fertility 
equation in the first generation of models. Thus, the early results were marred by bias from 
omitted variables and, according to the authors, the 2005 publication provides more reliable 
estimates.  The  third  paper  pays  more  attention  to  identification  issues  and  runs  different 
identification  assumptions.  For  that  reason,  we  will  only  consider  the  results  of  the  later 
publications  that  provide  ex  ante  micro-simulations  of  the  impact  of  financial  transfers 
received by families. Here again, the impact of financial support is significant but relatively 
weak. In all, the costing elasticity of the ―demand‖ for children is estimated at 0.2 in the 2005 
paper; a 25% reduction in the cost of children would increase fertility by only 5%. However, 
the responsiveness of fertility behaviour varies with birth parity: the higher the birth order, the 
more sensitive the fertility behaviour to financial variations. Thus, for example, the extension 
of the APE that encourages mothers of a second child to leave the labour market increases the 
number of births by an estimated 3.7%, representing an increase of 10.9% in births at parity 2, 
minus a 2.4% drop in the number of births at parity 3 because the birth of a third child then 
became less attractive
6. In all, these estimates should be interpreted very cautiously since they 
vary with the strategy  used to identify labour and fertility decisions. Moreover, they all are 
based on a very limited  (and selected?) sample of births
7 and quite heroic assumptions  are 
needed to extrapolate these results to the overall population. 
                                                 
6 Note, however, that this result is very sensitive to the estimation strategy. The above-mentioned result is indeed 
in contradiction to their previous paper, where they estimated that financial incentives would have a considerable 
influence on fertility at parity one, but none for two-child or larger families (Laroque and Salanié, 2004). In their 
most recent paper, the authors found, conversely, that the first and third births are more sensitive to child credit 
than the second (Laroque and Salanié, 2008). 
7 The simulations are based on just over 2,600 women with a newborn babies, i.e. far fewer than the annual 
variation in the number of births that stood at about 10,000 in the 1990s. There is thus no guarantee that the 
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However  robust  their  estimation,  one  should  be  cautious  in  using  these  results  to 
assess the effectiveness of financial incentives on fertility behaviour. Some restrictions on the 
sample design
8 and on the fertility equation can be questioned. Moreover, ex ante simulations 
are certainly insufficient to assess the impact of policies, and must be complemented by ex 
post studies based on actual behaviours.  
In this perspective, Piketty (2005) also aimed to quantify the effect of parental leave 
compensation (APE) on both fertility and women‘s‘ labour supply in an ex post evaluation 
using both labour force surveys and the 1999 Family Survey. The extension of the allowance 
for the birth of a second child in 1994 served as a natural experiment. Here, the challenge was 
to control for possible windfall effects, i.e. for the fact that some women would have had a 
child or left the labour market without the change in legislation. The effects on fertility are 
hard to quantify, but Piketty argues that the extension of the APE would not have explained 
more than 20-30% of the increase in the total births observed from 1994 to 2001 (at most 10% 
of third births and between 10% and 20% of second births).  
III.6.  …but a larger (negative) impact on female labour market 
participation 
According to  Piketty‘s results,  the effects  on female labour force participation  are 
more spectacular, with payment of the APE to mothers with two children (with the youngest 
under 3 years of age) inducing between 100,000 and 150,000 withdrawals from the labour 
market. Thus, between 50% and 70% of the 220,000 full-rate APE recipients would not have 
left the labour force at the second birth if they had not received the benefit. 
The  author  also  pointed  out  the  cumulative  effect,  since  receiving  the  APE  for  a 
second birth appears to have induced some 50,000 mothers with 3 children to leave the labour 
market after the third birth. Thus, the APE reform resulted in an estimated total of 150,000 
and 200,000 interruptions of female labour market participation. Moschion (2007) argues that 
women anticipated their labour market withdrawal: before 1994, mothers left their jobs after a 
third child; after 1994 they were more likely to do so after second. She concludes that this 
effect may prove the role of financial incentives.  
Finally, Piketty‘s results also showed that mothers with two children do not seem to 
have suffered particular difficulties in returning to the labour market since their probability of 
working increased over the period. A similar conclusion was reached by Thévenon (2007) 
who observed that the probability of being in employment (full-time) increased in about the 
same proportion as for childless women or mothers with one child in the period 1996-2005, 
after a lag that may be explained by the extension of the APE. 
III.7.  A large number of women in full-time employment before 
the birth of a second child 
This trend illustrates the specific situation in France of female employment and the 
work-family balance. Compared to other OECD and European countries, the employment rate 
of women aged between 15 to 64 years is just above the OECD average at 58.6%. If we look 
at the correlation between the fertility period and female employment rates in 2005, we can 
see that compared to other countries with same rate of female employment, the fertility rate in 
France is relatively high (especially compared to continental, southern or eastern European 
countries, Korea and Japan). Of course, the correlation can be viewed the other way round 
                                                 
8 For instance, the sample did not include households with a retiree, a self-employed person or a civil servant; it 
also focused on women who had completed their schooling more than two years previously to avoid dealing with 
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with the less positive interpretation that, for a given fertility rate, the female employment rate 
is lower in France than in Nordic European and Anglo-Saxon countries (US, Australia, New-
Zealand and the UK). However, one difference with respect to this last group of countries is 
that  full-time  employment  remains  the  norm  in  France,  although  part-time  work  rose 
significantly during the 1990s (Thévenon, 2007). In France, as in Denmark, Canada, Finland, 
Portugal  or  Sweden,  the  most  frequent  situation  is  clearly  both  parents  in  full-time 
employment (Aliaga, 2005). Another specific feature of France compared to other continental 
European countries is the way in which the labour market behaviour of French women adjusts 
to each stage in the family formation process. The effect of the first birth on withdrawal from 
the labour market is very weak, and weaker than for higher parity births (Thévenon, 1999; 
2006).  Furthermore,  the  full-time  employment  rate  is  more  sensitive  to  the  number  of 
children, and especially to the presence of a third child, than to the age of those children. Part-
time work concerns mothers with two or three children, and implies relatively long working 
hours compared with other European countries (Thévenon, 2007; Chaupain-Guillot et al., 
2007).  
III.8.  Childcare costs have more impact on the use of paid care 
than on the female labour supply 
In this context, it is important to consider policies that primarily affect the female 
labour  supply  where  it  is  not  possible  to  consider  simultaneously  their  potential  induced 
impact on fertility. Most studies limit their investigation to the effect of institutional variations 
on the use of policy measures and female labour supply. Only a limited number of such 
studies exists in France and these mostly examine the impact of childcare costs on the demand 
for formal paid childcare and female labour supply. Choné et al. (2004) found that, overall, 
childcare costs impacted the use of paid care but had only a very weak effect on female labour 
market participation. These costs, together with female potential wages, have a stronger and 
more significant effect on working hours. These estimates show that withdrawal of the APE at 
parity  2  would  have  a  significant  impact  on  female  labour  force  participation  (+11%  of 
mothers of 2 children with the youngest aged under 3) and on the use of formal paid childcare 
(+4%). However, the global impact on the employment rate would be moderate, with an 
increase of about 4%, due the relatively small share of population concerned by the APE. By 
contrast, tax reductions related to childcare costs would have only a limited impact. 
III.9.  A probable (but uncertain) effect of early preschool 
enrolment of children on full-time female labour supply  
Comparative analysis suggests that preschool entry of 3 year-old children is a turning 
point since there is subsequently a significant increase in the full-time female employment 
rate — a higher increase than that observed among mothers of older children (Thévenon, 
2007). The exact contribution of early preschool enrolment on the female labour supply is 
uncertain, however. De Curraize (2005) analyses the effect of early school enrolment (at age 
2) on the duration of the mother‘s interruption of labour market participation and finds it 
impossible to conclude to a positive effect. Moschion (2007) finds that providing mothers of 
two-year old children with childcare facilities modifies the effect of fertility on the mothers‘ 
labour  supply  and  may  have  a  positive  impact  on  combining  work  and  family  life.  In 
particular, Moschion finds that having more than two children has a negative effect on labour 
force participation and hours worked in French départements with relatively low 2-year old 
enrolment  rates.  Conversely,  the  effects  are  positive  in  départements  where  preschool 
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and should therefore be interpreted cautiously. Clearer evidence is found on the impact of 
early preschool enrolment on labour supply of lone mothers, while no negative effects on 
child development are simultaneously observed (Goux and Maurin, 2008). 
 
Conclusion: towards a broader policy approach to fertility 
regulation? 
As stated in the first part of this paper, France has relatively high total fertility rate 
compared to other European countries, and these rates have increased significantly since the 
mid-1990s.  The  rate  remains  quite  stable  after  controlling  for  tempo  effects,  however, 
suggesting that the increase in TFR may reflect some sort of catch-up effect among women 
who had postponed childbearing. In a longer-term perspective, the decrease in  completed 
fertility reflects the generalization of the two-child norm. The proportion of women remaining 
childless in France is also lower than in many other European countries.  
Family policies do help women to combine motherhood with work. First, financial 
transfers through cash benefits and tax allowances reduce the ―cost‖ of children but their 
direct effect on fertility appears to be limited. The measured effects of transfers are estimated 
to account for at maximum one tenth of fertility rates. Although far from negligible, these 
effects are not very large. They nonetheless significantly contribute to maintaining fertility 
rates close to replacement level. Second, substantial support is also provided to families with 
children under the age of 3 or 6 years to alleviate the cost of childcare, and the literature 
suggests  a  large  response  to  this  financial  support  in  terms  of  female  labour  market 
participation  and  coordination of family formation. However,  to  account  for the ‗stylized 
facts‘ reviewed in the this paper, the financial aspect is certainly only one part of the story. 
For instance, one reason why childlessness is less frequent in France is certainly that the birth 
of a first child is more compatible with employment, even full-time employment, and does not 
hinder  future  career  development.  One  argument  for  this  is  that  employment  stability 
increasingly appears to be a precondition for entry into parenthood (Toulemon and Leridon, 
1999;  Méron  and  Widmer,  2002).  Thus,  empirical  evidence  shows  that  women  who 
experience a period of unemployment postpone the birth of the first child, compared to both 
inactive  and  employed  women,  and  this  is  more  prevalent  for  less  qualified  women  and 
younger cohorts (Méron and Widmer, 2002). Among the individuals who intend to have a 
child, the experience of unemployment also reduces the probability of realizing their intention 
within a five year period (Toulemon and Testa, 2005).  
The  more  frequent  (or  more  rapid)  entry  to  first  motherhood  in  France  may  be 
explained by the fairly comprehensive support received by women who combine motherhood 
with full-time labour market participation. As stated in the second part of this paper, this 
support  is  relatively  diversified  in  terms  of  financial  benefits,  childcare  subsidies  and 
provision  of  services,  and  is  also  continuous  over  the  childhood  period  (Adema  and 
Thévenon, 2008).  Such comprehensive support is likely to address family needs and secure 
the transition to motherhood and employment. This broad set of measures creates a systemic 
coherence that lowers the potentially irreversible consequences of fertility on lifelong career 
development patterns. It may also be a crucial ingredient of the ―trust‖ needed for policies to 
be effective. It is also one reason why women do not forgo having a second or a third child, 
and explains why the decision to have children or to be in employment is less polarized by 
socioeconomic status in France than elsewhere. 
However, it is tricky to identify and quantify the extent to which policies contribute to 
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be  necessary  to  investigate  further  to  find  out  if  and  how  labour  market  flexibility  (i.e. 
flexitime or part-time working, as well as increased mobility between jobs observed during 
lifetime  careers)  influences  fertility  decisions.  Contrasting  consequences  can  indeed  be 
expected: on the one hand, flexible workplace practices can have a positive influence on 
fertility decisions by helping parents to find a satisfactory balance between work and family 
life; on the other hand, the additional job instability or the unwanted consequences on career 
development can add to the uncertainty that leads couples either to postpone births or to forgo 
having children. Only a few studies have started to investigate these consequences on fertility 
intentions  in  France.  Cette  et  al.  (2005)  suggest  that  the  organization  of  working  life 
influences the intended number of children, and more significantly for individuals with a 
higher  socioeconomic  status.  The  lack  of  time  and  of  predictable  working  hours  may 
influence the timing of childbearing. Pailhé (2009) found that flexible work schedules or the 
provision of childcare by employers may positively impact intentions of having a first child. 
All  these  working  conditions  are  important  to  capture,  since  differences  in  workplace 
practices  in  European  companies  seem  to  add  to  the  role  of  public  support  rather  than 
compensate some lack of public support (Thévenon, 2008).  
We may also need to better understand the role of institutions as a ―filter‖ capable of 
modifying the way in which an uncertain environment over the life-course affects different 
population groups (Blossfeld et al., 2004). This is an important issue since we observe that 
highly educated individuals achieve their fertility intentions more frequently, whether or not 
they intend to have a child (Toulemon and Testa, 2005). More fundamentally, one challenge 
is to better understand how micro-level determinants of the life-course, and macro-conditions 
and institutions interact to shape the transition to parenthood (Billari, 2004). This means that 
we need to identify how institutions temper the effect of macro-level situations on micro-level 
factors. We also need to identify the extent to which the effective impact of family policy is 
conditional upon the complementarity of family support over the life-course, and thus how 
such complementarities shapes the transition to motherhood. 
However, even such a sophisticated framework would give a misleading picture of the 
fertility  situation  in  France  if  it  did  not  take  into  account  the  relatively  positive  attitude 
towards family in that country, as observed by Testa and Grilli (2006) in their European 
comparison of fertility preferences. As highlighted by Toulemon et al. (2008), 95% of French 
people want at least one child, a proportion very similar to the high levels observed in most 
other European countries. There are regional disparities, however, since the ―preference‖ for 
children is more widespread in southern regions. This is interpreted by Toulemon and al. 
(2008) as an indication that French fertility ideals are linked to its cultural past (southern 
regions being more representative of that past). By contrast, the ideal number of children 
among people with a confirmed desire to have a child is extremely high in France, with the 
highest score at 2.34 (just behind Ireland), and less heterogeneous between regions. As argued 
by the authors, this positive attitude towards large families may be partly nurtured by the 
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